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Abstract—Timing is a key non-functional property in embed-
ded real-time systems (ERTS). ERTS increasingly require higher
levels of performance that can only be sensibly provided by
deploying high-performance hardware, which however compli-
cates timing analysis. Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing
Analysis (MBPTA) aims at analysing the timing behaviour of
ERTS deploying complex hardware features such as caches. A key
parameter for MBPTA to provide reliable results is the number
of runs to perform to ensure probabilistic representativeness of the
execution time measurements taken at analysis time with respect
to execution times that can occur during system operation. In this
paper, focusing on the cache – acknowledged as one of the most
complex resources to time analyse – we address the problem
of determining whether the number of observations taken at
analysis, as part of the normal MBPTA application process,
captures the cache events significantly impacting execution time
and Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET). If this is not the case,
our techniques provide the user with the number of extra runs
to perform to guarantee that those cache events are captured
ensuring confidence on provided WCET estimates.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of unmanned vehicles and criticality-related
on-board features makes that Embedded Real-Time Systems
(ERTS) increasingly deal with highly sophisticated – and
complex – value-added software functionalities. These, in
turn, require higher levels of computing power to be timely
executed. High-performance hardware is the natural way to
respond to these performance needs, but it is well-known
that it challenges timing analysis techniques which make
pessimistic, yet reliable, assumptions on resource latencies,
resulting in longer (degraded) Worst-Case Execution Time
(WCET) estimates [2].
Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis
(MBPTA) [5] deals with complex hardware while staying
close to industrial timing analysis practice. MBPTA, whose
potential viability in industrial setups has been positively
assessed [27], [28], provides a probabilistic WCET (pWCET)
estimate: a distribution expressing the residual risk [12], [24]
(in the form of a probability) with which one instance of
the program is proven not to exceed a given execution time
bound. That probability is made low enough to be in line
with the standards in the application domain that dictate the
degree of rigor required in system assurance.
MBPTA deploys Extreme Value Theory [6], [18] (EVT) on
a set of execution time observations captured in the analysis
tests. From those observations, whose number is maintained
in the range of thousands to keep the analysis cost affordable,
EVT estimates bounds on the timing behaviour of tasks during
operation for much smaller probabilities, e.g. 10−15 per run.
The use of EVT in MBPTA is challenged by the fact that
the execution time observations used for the prediction are
collected at analysis time, while the pWCET estimate must
provide a reliable upper-bound during operation. This requires
dealing with representativeness [4] such that evidence is pro-
vided on the fact that analysis time observations capture the
impact of those events that can arise during operation and
significantly impact execution time and so, pWCET. These are
called events of interest (eoi). Hence, for a correct application
of MBPTA it is critically important to capture in the analysis-
time measurements those events that can increase execution
time meaningfully for a reliable application of MBPTA [1].
Caches are one of the resources whose timing behaviour
is hard to analyse [7], [8], [10], [19], [21], [22]. For the set
of processor architectures considered so far in MBPTA [16]
— which resembles that of the LEON3 [25] processor, caches
have been shown to be the only resource that challenges the
reliability of MBPTA [1]. In particular, a cache eoi is triggered
when a number of program objects (i.e. code or data) larger
than the associativity (W) are mapped to the same set [1].
This event may cause an abrupt increase in the number of
misses with the corresponding increase in execution time [1],
[23] with respect to the case where at most W addresses
are mapped to the same set. If such an eoi can happen
during operation with non-negligible (relevant) probability, at
least one eoi needs to be observed in the runs performed at
analysis time, not to compromise MBPTA reliability. Relevant
probability depends on the domain specific safety standard and
the application safety integrity level such that the residual risk
cannot be deemed as sufficiently low, e.g. above 10−9 per hour
of operation for DAL-A applications in avionics [24].
Illustrative example: let us assume a 4-way 32-set cache
and a program comprising 8 single-line objects. In general
if 5 or more of these objects are mapped to the same set,
they will evict each other in cache causing an increase in
the miss rate and execution time. This is in contrast to the
case when only 4 or less objects are mapped to the same
set, since they fit in that set. In a time randomised cache
in which addresses (objects) are – in each run – randomly
mapped to sets, the probability that 5 or more objects are
mapped in the same cache set is 4.9 · 10−5. Hence there is
a low probability that in 1,000 experiments (a typical number
of runs with MBPTA) this cache event of interest is captured.
In particular this probability is 0.048. This is a problem for
MBPTA since, without observing this event, MBPTA cannot
predict its impact and how it can interact with other timing
events. Hence, for a correct application of MBPTA we must
ensure that we make enough analysis runs so that this event
is captured at least in one of the runs.
Contribution. For set associative time-randomised caches
(TRc), which have been already prototyped into FPGAs [11],
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Fig. 1. Synthetic program’s PDF, CDF, 1-CDF and pWCET curve. Probabilities of interest for MBPTA.
hence having a high Technology Readiness Level (TRL), this
paper proposes a technique to compute in an exact manner the
probability of the cache event of interest, called PTRceoi . This
is a fundamental step to gain confidence on pWCET estimates
obtained with MBPTA. Given the set of objects to be allocated
and their size – which is known at design time – our technique
determines whether with the number of runs R carried out
at analysis time, the cache event of interest will be captured
with a sufficiently high probability. If this is not the case, our
technique reports back the increased number of runs to carry
out R′ so that confidence is regained on the fact that the eoi
will be observed. With focus on programs with homogeneously
accessed objects, we make the following contributions:
1) We present an exact formulation of PTRceoi in contrast
to previous approximation formulas [1]. We iden-
tify the reasons for the inaccuracies of the previous
technique proposed in [1] and we qualitatively and
quantitatively compare it with our approach.
2) We present a methodology, which building on pre-
vious formulas, determines whether more runs are
required to ensure that all relevant events of interest
are captured in the analysis-time measurements.
3) We provide a solid evaluation based on synthetic
benchmarks for sensitivity analysis and a real avion-
ics application [27].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
states the problem addressed in this paper and introduces some
basic concepts. Section III presents our approach to model the
confidence of timing analysis for TRc. Section IV presents
some experimental results. Section V describes some related
work. Finally, Section VI summarises our main conclusions.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BASIC CONCEPTS
MBPTA provides a pWCET distribution function that
describes the residual risk in the form of an exceedance
probability (e.g., 10−15 per run) at which evidence cannot
be retrieved on whether one instance of a program cannot
exceed the corresponding execution time bound. For instance,
Figure 1(a) represents for several runs of a synthetic pro-
gram on a MBPTA-compliant platform [4], the probability
distribution function (PDF) and Figure 1(b) – in logarithmic
scale – the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the
complementary CDF (1-CDF). When collecting a sample
with R observations (execution time measurements), one could
estimate the pWCET at an exceedance probability of 1/R at
most. Since much smaller probabilities (so lower residual risk)
are needed in the context of safety-relevant systems, EVT is
used to estimate the function that describes the rightmost tail
of the execution time distribution. For our example, Figure 1(c)
shows the result of collecting R = 1, 000 measurements and
applying EVT to estimate the pWCET distribution. The dashed
line corresponds to the 1-CDF for the 1,000 measurements
collected in the test runs performed at analysis time, whereas
the solid line corresponds to the pWCET distribution estimates
with EVT that must hold during operation.
The pWCET estimates obtained with MBPTA stay valid
under the execution conditions considered at analysis time
once the system is in operation. Those execution conditions
include all events that may impact the execution time of
the program under analysis (e.g., memory layout, arbitration
in shared resources). However, the conditions experienced
at analysis time differ from those during operation simply
because the latter may be unknown. In particular MBPTA
imposes several requirements beyond those of EVT [4], [5]
which, as used in MBPTA [5], requires a data sample of a
random variable so that each execution time observation is
independent and identically distributed. Additionally, MBPTA
defines representativeness as the requirement in which the
impact of any relevant event affecting execution time is prop-
erly upper-bounded at analysis time, where a relevant event
corresponds to any event occurring with a probability above a
cutoff threshold (e.g. 10−9 per hour of operation). We relate
such threshold to the assurance/integrity level of the task and
the probability of hardware random failures allowed under
such assurance/integrity level as dictated by the corresponding
functional safety standards in the domain. In particular, in
the context of MBPTA the cutoff threshold upper bounds the
residual risk under which evidence of reliable operation is
not had as detailed later in Section II-B. While those events
occurring with overly low probability become irrelevant for
pWCET estimation purposes, events occurring with higher
probability need to be accounted for, and this requires that their
effect is captured in the measurements taken at analysis time.
This occurs because, while EVT predicts the combined impact
and the probability of observed events, EVT cannot predict in
general those events that are never observed and whose impact
in execution time is larger than that of the observed ones [1].
MBPTA representativeness (Figure 2) on the events of
interest (eoi) relates to two specific probabilities.
The exceedance probability (Pexc) defines the lowest relevant
probability for events occurring during operation. Events with
smaller probability than Pexc are considered not relevant.
Pexc is a function of the safety standards in the application
domain and the criticality (integrity) level of the program. For
instance, for commercial airborne systems at the highest assur-
Fig. 2. Range of probabilities of interest for MBPTA.
ance/integrity level (DAL-A), the maximum allowed random
hardware failure rate in a system component is 10−9 per hour
of operation [24]. Thus, we use the same threshold to upper
bound the residual risk in the software verification process.
The observable probability (Pobs) determines the lowest prob-
ability of occurrence of an event such that the probability of not
observing it in the execution time measurements collected at
analysis time is below a cutoff probability, e.g. Pcoff = 10−9.
Pobs is a function of the probability of occurrence per run
of the event, Peoi, and the number of runs R (observations)
collected by MBPTA at analysis time:
Pobs = 1− (1− Peoi)R (1)
For instance, for a cutoff probability of Pcoff = 10−9
and R = 1, 000 runs, events with Peoi ≥ 0.021 will not be
observed with a probability below Pcoff , that is, 10−9 ≥ (1−
0.021)1000. It also follows that the higher the number of runs,
the lower the Peoi that can be captured. Similar to Pexc, Pcoff
is a function of the applicable safety standard and criticality
level. Pexc and Pobs define (Figure 2) three probability ranges:
1) r1 is the probability interval for which a probabilistic
argument can be provided on the fact that events with
a probability in this range are captured in R runs, i.e.
the probability of not observing them is irrelevant.
2) r2 corresponds to the probability interval for which
events may not be observed, yet they are considered
relevant for the correctness (i.e. non-optimism) of the
pWCET estimate.
3) r3 corresponds to the probability interval below the
exceedance threshold. Events occurring during oper-
ation with such a low (or smaller) probability are re-
garded as irrelevant in relation with the corresponding
safety standard and criticality of the function.
This paper aims to determine Peoi, taking different actions
depending on its value: If Peoi ∈ r1 or Peoi ∈ r3 MBPTA is
deemed as reliable as described above. However, when Peoi ∈
r2 it is required to determine the increase in the number of
runs (∆R) to carry out. Increasing the number of runs to R′ =
R + ∆R increases Pobs to P ′obs such that events with lower
probability can be observed, making that P ′eoi ∈ r1. Hence, our
proposed approach is vital to maintain confidence on MBPTA-
provided pWCET estimates.
A. Cache-related representativeness challenges
The Heart of Gold (HoG) approach [1] is the first attempt
to address representativeness issues of cache related events for
Fig. 3. Miss rates (in log scale) for different number of addresses accessed
in a round-robin fashion competing for a 8-way cache set.
hardware time-randomised caches (TRc). HoG, whose repre-
sentativeness findings for TRc were also identified in [20], [23],
addresses the scenario in which the execution times, obtained
from a MBPTA-compliant architecture deploying TRc [14]
cause MBPTA to yield optimistic pWCET estimates. Authors
in [1] note that the number of addresses competing for a set
is the critical parameter affecting execution time noticeably. If
competing addresses fit in the cache set – so there are up to W
addresses where W is the cache associativity – then they will
end up fitting in the cache set after some random evictions.
Conversely, if there are more than W cache line addresses
competing for the cache set space, then they do not fit and
evictions will occur often, if all those cache lines are accessed
often and in an interleaved fashion. This scenario where more
than W cache line addresses compete for the space in a cache
set is therefore the cache event of interest. We illustrate this
scenario by performing an experiment where we access a
number of addresses, between 1 and 17, in a loop iterating
1,000,000 times and accessing a cache set with W = 8, as
seen in Figure 3. Miss rates are very low when the number of
addresses does not exceed the space in the set. However, the
miss rate increases abruptly (4 orders of magnitude) when 9
or more contending addresses are accessed.
Overall, for the sanity of the MBPTA results, it is crucial
to determine whether execution times resulting from W + 1
addresses competing for the same cache set can occur with a
sufficiently high probability to be relevant and, in that case,
make sure they are included in the observations, which defines
our event of interest for the cache. In HoG authors provided
an approximate formula to derive Peoi on TRc. However, as
we show later, its inaccuracy can be significant in some cases,
so we provide means to compute the exact value of Peoi.
Let U be the number of addresses accessed by the program
under analysis. In this paper we assume that the impact on
execution time of mapping any arbitrary group of K addresses
to the same set – with K ∈ [W + 1, U ] – is similar. This
is the case, for instance, for the instruction addresses for
many programs that may access them homogeneously inside
a main control loop. In this case our method would require
identifying those relevant addresses. In other cases where
addresses are accessed heterogeneously (e.g., data accesses for
control applications) a different solution would be required.
Such a solution will likely require analysing program’s access
patterns. This is part of our current work.
B. Relating exceedance probabilities and safety standards
Functional safety standards such as DO178B/C [24] in
avionics and ISO26262 [12] in automotive relate assurance
(integrity) levels with failure rates, either absolute or per hour
of operation. However, software verification and testing is not
explicitly related to those failure rates.
In any software verification process in the context of certi-
fication there is a qualitative step to collect “enough” evidence
about software not failing during operation, where standards
describe appropriate means to collect sufficient evidence for
the different assurance (integrity) levels. In the context of
MBPTA, pWCET estimates come along with an exceedance
threshold. Such threshold upper bounds the risk of one instance
of the task to overrun its assigned budget, i.e. suffering a timing
violation (failure). The purpose of the exceedance threshold
is not truly upper-bounding software failure rates which, in
principle, are not allowed, but upper-bounding the residual risk
of the software verification process.
For instance, with deterministic caches the placement of
objects in memory determines which cache set each object is
assigned to (e.g. based on modulo placement) resulting in a
given cache layout. Conventional measurement-based practice
on deterministic caches relies on the user ability to reduce
the risk of not evaluating memory placements leading to bad
cache layouts that produce high execution times, which can
occur during operation. Such (residual) risk is only assessed
qualitatively given that the user, despite making many tests,
does not have a way to determine whether the space of
potential memory mappings (and the corresponding cache
layouts) is truly covered. This occurs because for complex
software it is hard to force a particular placement in a test
run.
In the context of MBPTA and time randomised caches, the
space of potential cache layouts and their impact is randomly
explored: in each run, a random cache layout (mapping of
objects to sets) is explored. In this way, the risk brought by
unexplored placements is no longer to be controlled by the end
user but it is transferred to the confidence had on the pWCET
estimate obtained based on a given number of runs. As we
present in this paper, it is possible to assess the probability of
a particular mapping not to be observed.
Thus, while end users need to argue qualitatively on the
non-existence of unobserved placements when using non-
probabilistic measurement-based methods, MBPTA allows to
argue quantitatively on the fact that evidence shows that
pWCET estimates are not exceeded with extremely high prob-
abilities, and the residual risk (a.k.a. exceedance threshold),
which can be made arbitrarily low, indicates that beyond that
probability (e.g., 10−15 per program run) evidence is not had
and so there is some residual risk of failure.
Interestingly, the certification process is the same as for
conventional (non-probabilistic) practice, but replacing user’s
ability and unquantified residual risk by a systematic and sound
approach and a quantitatively upper-bounded residual risk.
III. TIMING ANALYSIS OF TRC
TRc [14], which have been prototyped into LEON3 [25]
designs in FPGA [11], combine the address being accessed
with a random number (RII) to compute the (random) set
where the address is placed. RII is generated by a pseudo-
random number generator [3] that provides sequences with
long periods to prevent any correlations among random events.
RII holds constant during the program execution so that an
address is placed in the same set during the whole execution,
TABLE I. BASIC NOTATION.
O Sequence of objects to allocate
R Number of runs carried out by MBPTA at analysis time
S, W Number of sets and ways (respectively) in cache
ai Cache allocation scenario i
amaxi Maximum allocation of any set in ai
but it is randomly changed across executions so that the
particular set where an address is placed is also random and
independent from the placement for the other addresses across
executions. As a result, with TRc the probability of assigning
a given object to any set is independent of how the previous
objects were allocated. Further, each object actually has the
same probability to be assigned to a given set, see Eq. 2.
PsetTRci =
1
S
(2)
Next, we analyse the current approach [1] to approximate
PTRceoi showing why it does not provide the exact value. Then
we introduce an approach based on multinomial coefficient
to define an exact formula to PTRceoi . To that end we use the
notation in Table I and also build on the following definitions.
It is noted that TRc assign different addresses to different
sets regardless of whether those addresses belong to the same
(software) object. As a result, the allocation of a multi-line
object of size l lines is equivalent to the allocation of l objects
of size 1 line. That is, the allocation of n objects i ∈ [0, n−1]
with sizes {li} is equivalent to the allocation of
∑n−1
i=0 {li}
objects of size 1.
Definition 1 (Allocation Scenario): An allocation scenario
defines how allocated objects are mapped to sets. We denote
allocation scenarios as ai, with ai = (a1i , a
2
i , ..., a
S
i ). a
j
i is the
number of objects allocated to set sj under ai.
Definition 2 (Cardinality of an allocation scenario): The
cardinality of an allocation scenario |ai| is given by the
number of objects allocated under it.
Definition 3 (Maximum of an allocation scenario): The
maximum of an allocation scenario amaxi , is given by the
maximum number of objects allocated to any set in that
allocation scenario.
Definition 4 (Cache event of interest): The cache event of
interest is defined by those scenarios, called scenarios of
interest, that have a set where the number of allocated objects
is higher than W , i.e. ai|amaxi > W .
For instance, for a 3-set 2-way cache (S=3, W=2) and a se-
quence with 3 single-line objects (|O| = 3), the allocation sce-
narios are A = {(0, 0, 3), (0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (0, 3, 0), (1, 0, 2),
(1, 1, 1), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0), (3, 0, 0)}. From those, the
scenarios of interest are (3, 0, 0), (0, 3, 0) and (0, 0, 3).
Definition 5 (Probability of the event of interest): The
probability of the event of interest (Peoi) is given by the
addition of the probabilities for the allocation of scenarios of
interest.
A. Weak compositions based approach
Determining whether at least W + 1 objects out of the
|O| under consideration are mapped into the same cache set
requires deriving all potential mappings of the |O| objects into
the S cache sets and the fraction of those mappings in which
at least one cache set has W + 1 objects allocated. As shown
in [1] these values can be approximated by means of weak
compositions theory. A weak composition of an integer n is
a way of writing n as the sum of a sequence of non-negative
integers [9]. We are interested in all the weak compositions of
|O| made of exactly S parts where at least one part is higher
than W and the total number of weak compositions of |O| is
exactly S sets. When no limit is put on the values of the parts
we have WComp(|O|, S,−). If we impose that no part can
have more than W objects we have WComp(|O|, S,≤W ).
The probability of the mappings of all objects such that one
part is greater than W can be approximated as:
̂PTRceoi−wc(|O|, S,W ) = 1− WComp(|O|, S,≤W )WComp(|O|, S,−) (3)
The problem of this approach is that it considers that all
potential allocation scenarios have the same probability. How-
ever, in reality two scenarios can have different probabilities.
For instance, Figure 4 shows all possible allocation scenarios
(10) resulting from allocating 3 objects in a 3-set cache. Edges
represent how scenarios are allocated while nodes show each
allocation scenario. The nodes in the same level have the same
number of allocated objects. In this example, the event of
interest for a 2-way cache is computed with weak compositions
as ̂PTRceoi−wc(3, 3, 2) = 1 − 7/10 = 3/10, while in reality it is
3/27, as we present later in this section.
B. Multinomial coefficient based approach
In explaining our proposed approach based on multinomial
coefficient we further make the following definition.
Definition 6 (Path of allocation scenarios leading to ai):
Given an allocation scenario ai, each of the successions of
allocations in the probability tree leading to ai is called
path to ai. Each path leading to ai is represented as
pth(ai) ∈ PTH(ai), where PTH(ai) is the set of all paths
leading to ai.
For instance, in the example in Figure 4 the path leading to
a = (2, 0, 0) is PTH(2, 0, 0) = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0)}
With TRc, all the paths reaching any of the allocation
scenarios with the same cardinality have the same probabil-
ity. This occurs because for every new allocated object the
probability of being mapped to any set does not vary with the
allocation of previous objects. After all objects in O have been
allocated (represented by the leaves in Figure 4), the cardinality
of any of the potential resulting allocation scenarios ai equals
to the number of allocated objects, i.e. |ai| = |O|, and the
probability of reaching any of them through one path is:
PTRcpth(|ai|) =
(
1
S
)|ai|
∀ai (4)
It is worth noting that not all allocation scenarios with
the same cardinality are reached the same number of times,
i.e. the number of paths leading to each scenario varies. For
instance, in the example in Figure 4, from all those scenarios
with cardinality three, PTH(ai) for ai = (3, 0, 0) comprises
1 path, while PTH(aj) for aj = (1, 1, 1) comprises 6 paths.
We approach the problem of computing the number of
times a specific allocation scenario can be reached – which
determines the number of paths leading to it – using the com-
binatorial interpretation of the multinomial coefficient [26].
The multinomial coefficient defines the possible combinations
of distributing n elements over k containers, each containing
exactly y = (y1, y2, ..., yk) elements. By replacing n by |O|,
k by S and yj by aji , the multinomial coefficient provides
the number of times ai can be reached, i.e. the number of
paths from the original empty allocation scenario leading to
ai, which we call Npai. Npai is computed as follows:
Npai =
(
n
ai
)
=
n!
a1i !a
2
i ! · · · aSi !
(5)
For instance, in the example in Figure 4 (3-sets cache and
3 objects) the number of times that the possible combinations
give the outcome ai = (1, 1, 1) is given by Npai =
(
3
1,1,1
)
=
6.
We derive the probability of a specific allocation scenario
by multiplying the number of paths leading to it by the
probability of a single path:
PTRcai = Npai · PTRcpth(|ai|) =
( |ai|
ai
)
·
(
1
S
)|ai|
(6)
In the previous example, PTRcai for ai = (1, 1, 1) is 6 ·(
1
3
)3
= 627 .
Overall, PTRceoi is computed by adding P
TRc
ai for those
allocation scenarios of interest ai|max(ai) > W .
PTRceoi (|O|, S,W ) =
∑
∀ai|max(ai)>W
PTRcai (7)
For instance in the example in Figure 4 (3-sets cache and
3 objects) and assuming that the cache has W = 2 ways, the
allocation scenarios where the event of interest occurs are:
ai = (3, 0, 0), aj = (0, 3, 0) and ak = (0, 0, 3). Adding
the probabilities of each one of this scenarios gives the total
probability PTRceoi =
1
27 +
1
27 +
1
27 =
3
27 .
The advantage of the multinomial coefficient approach is
that it can exactly compute PTRceoi while the weak compositions
approach only approximates it. Yet, its computational cost is
non-negligible. In particular, while the probability of a specific
scenario of interest is fast to compute, the enumeration of all
the scenarios of interest may take long (still less than half
an hour per program in our experiments). Reducing the timing
needs of our approach is part of our future work. As explained
in following sections, the number of runs R required to gain
sufficient confidence on MBPTA depends on PTRceoi . Thus,
failing to compute PTRceoi exactly may lead to not collecting
enough runs and hence, deriving optimistic pWCET estimates.
C. Increasing the number of runs
Given a sequence of objects O and a number of runs
carried out at analysis time R, the probability of the event
of interest PTRceoi , as computed in Equation 7 might be below
Pobs and above Pexc, shown in Figure 1(a) as range r2, which
challenges MBPTA reliability. With R runs done by default
Fig. 4. Probability tree when allocating 3 objects in a 3-set cache with TRc. Leaf nodes represent the different allocation scenarios with cardinality 3.
by MBPTA, the lowest probability of an event such that the
probability of not observing it in the R runs is below a given
cutoff probability Pcoff , is given by: (1 − PTRceoi )R ≤ Pcoff .
If we work out R we obtain R ≤ log(1−PeoiTRc)Pcoff hence
R ≤ log(Pcoff )
log(1−PTRceoi )
. The minimum number of runs R′ is:
R′ =
log(Pcoff )
log(1− PTRceoi )
(8)
With R′ it can be guaranteed that for the specified level
of confidence Pcoff the event of interest, whose probability is
PTRceoi , will be observed at analysis time.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we assess the different approaches proposed
to compute PTRceoi using several object sequences. We carry out
our experiments focusing on two cache setups, one small and
one big, which we respectively call scache and bcache. The
scache setup considers a 2KB size, 4-way, 8-set cache; while
the bcache setup considers a 8KB, 4-way, 32-set cache. The
scache, despite having a small size, has been considered to
allow the comparison with a brute force approach (probability
tree generation) as described later.
We consider randomly-generated sequences of objects of
two types regarding their size. Small objects whose size is in
the range [8B, 16B, 32B, 64B, 128B] and big objects whose
size ranges [256B, 1KB, 2KB, 8KB]. By mixing objects of
these two types we generate 3 types of object sequences.
The smallSeq comprises 100% of small objects, the balSeq
comprises 75% of small objects and 25% big objects and the
bigSeq comprises 50% of each group of objects. All object
sequences have a size of |O| = 100.
A. Accuracy Results
This section compares the results obtained for PTRceoi−mc
with our approach against weak compositions [1], i.e. ̂PTRceoi−wc.
As a reference we use a method that is exact to the desired
level of precision, but that has high memory and execution
time requirements, which grow exponentially with the number
of objects to allocate and the number of sets in cache. For this
reason, in this section, we use the scache setup. This method,
called probability tree generation, builds the probability tree
as presented in Figure 4. Before the allocation of any object, a
number of possible allocation scenarios exists (when the first
object is to be allocated this number is one, with no object
allocated). Each of those scenarios is expanded by allocating
the new object in every possible set. The probability of each
new generated scenario is the probability of the scenario from
which it expands times 1/S (see Eq. 2). After the expansion,
repeated scenarios are joined by adding their probabilities.
Figure 5(a) shows the result of the comparison. In particular
we show how the different PTRceoi estimates increase as more
objects are allocated. First, we observe that the higher the
number of allocated objects the higher the probability of the
eoi, that is, the higher the probability that more than W
addresses are mapped to the same set. Interestingly in this
example for sequences smaller than 5 objects the probability
of the cache eoi is below 10−9 that we use as the reference
exceedance probability, Pexc. When 10 objects are allocated
the PTRceoi is above Pobs (this is further discussed in the next
section). Note that we show Pobs for R = 300 and R = 1, 000,
two typical number of runs used by MBPTA.
Our multinomial coefficient method provides exactly the
same result (PTRceoi−mc) as the probability tree generation (tg)
method, while we observe deviations in the weak compositions
(wc) method presented in [1]. With wc the probability of the
eoi is higher than the exact one obtained with mc for a range
of object counts. This can lead to pessimistic/optimistic results
in terms of the number of runs to carry out:
1) PTRceoi−mc ∈ r3 and ̂PTRceoi−wc ∈ r3: In this case both
approaches, mc and wc, conclude that the probability
of the eoi is irrelevant.
2) PTRceoi−mc ∈ r3 and ̂PTRceoi−wc ∈ r2: In reality the
probability of the eoi is irrelevant and with wc the
user may be required to increase the number of runs.
3) PTRceoi−mc ∈ r2 and ̂PTRceoi−wc ∈ r2: The user is
asked to carry out, as a result of applying wc, fewer
experiments than required to ensure that the cache
eoi is captured, since ̂PTRceoi−wc > PTRceoi−mc.
4) PTRceoi−mc ∈ r2 and ̂PTRceoi−wc ∈ r1: As in the previous
case.
5) PTRceoi−mc ∈ r1 and ̂PTRceoi−wc ∈ r1: Both approaches,
mc and wc, indicate that the probability of the eoi is
captured with the runs carried out by the user.
Under cases 3) and 4) MBPTA may lead to optimistic
pWCET estimates if it is applied with the weak compositions
approach since the user is requested to perform fewer runs
than needed due to an overestimated PTRceoi .
B. Results with object Sequences
In Figure 5(b) we use the different object mixes previously
described and show PTRceoi (obtained with our multinomial
coefficient method) in each case as we increase the number
of objects allocated. For the scache, with balSeq (baS), when
allocating 1 to 3 objects the PTRceoi is in range r3, not shown
(a) PTRceoi vs
̂PTRceoi−wc [1].
(b) Results for different sequences.
Fig. 5. Experimental results for synthetic object sequences.
in the figure because it is below Pexc = 10−9. If the number
of objects allocated is within 4 and 6, PTRceoi is in the range r2,
which can lead to a relevant event being missed in the analysis
runs. When more than 7 objects are allocated, PTRceoi is in r1
so it is observable. Similar trends are observed for smS, bgS,
smB, baB, bgB, with the rule of thumb that the higher the
allocated object count, the higher the cache occupancy, and
hence the higher PTRceoi is and the faster it converges to r1.
Number of runs. In Figure 5(b) we observe that with
scache, for both smallSeq (smS) and balSeq (baS), when few
objects are allocated (between 3 and 6) PTRceoi is in r2. In
this scenario, in order to ensure that PTRceoi lies in r1, we use
Equation 8 to increase R. For instance, if we allocate 6 objects
in the smS we have that PTRceoi = 0.009833 and R
′ = 2, 097
runs would be needed to make sure that the event of interest
is captured (i.e. lies in r1). Similarly, for baS, if we allocate
5 objects, PTRceoi = 0.019943 and R
′ = 1, 028 runs would be
needed to guarantee that the PTRceoi is located in r1.
C. Avionics case study
Next we apply our techniques to an industrial-size case-
study [27] comprising around 5,000 functions ranging from
few bytes to 300KB. The total size of those functions is 4.7MB
if they are enforced to be aligned with cache line boundaries
assuming a cache line size of 32B. In this experiment the
focus is on code randomisation, i.e. on the instruction cache.
With instruction TRc the cache set assigned to instructions is
randomised across runs by hardware means. Figure 6 shows the
probability of the eoi for the allocation of these objects in both
Fig. 6. Experimental results for the avionics case study.
the scache and the bcache setups. For the scache we can see
that with as low as 4 objects allocated, the probability of the
eoi is above Pobs. For the bcache setup, we need around 150
objects to reach Pobs. Hence, for this particular application,
the number of runs carried out R = 1, 000 with MBPTA
standard process was enough to ensure representativeness of
the instruction cache events of interest.
It is also worth noting that this real case requires more
object allocations than the synthetic object mixes because
the average function size is smaller than the smaller objects
considered in our synthetic sequences. However, even with
objects this small, the number of objects that must be allocated
so that the event of interest is shown in the analysis runs is
largely below the total number of objects in the application.
V. RELATED WORK
Time-Randomised caches have been object of intense study
in the last years. Their level of maturity has raised until they
have been already prototyped in FPGA [11].
Several studies already compare the performance of
measurement-based timing analysis on top of TRc and static
timing analysis [2], [29] on top of time-deterministic caches.
In terms of WCET, results show that MBPTA provides com-
petitive results with respect to static timing analysis [16].
MBPTA also presents the advantage of being a measurement-
based approach that can be faster adapted to new processors
(systems) [29]. In terms of average performance, TRc have
slight worse behaviour than deterministic caches, 12% on
average [16]. Although this is not the focus of this paper
it is worth mentioning several works on static probabilistic
timing analysis (SPTA) for TRc [13], [14]. In general, SPTA
is in a much more immature state than MBPTA that has
been evaluated with avionics and automotive case studies [15],
[27], [28]. Further, an important difference with respect to
SPTA is that, while SPTA requires deriving or upper-bounding
the hit/miss probability of every cache access, MBPTA only
requires that the probability exists.
A set of techniques in the literature shows how MBPTA
handles control flow dependences and data dependences [16].
For control flow dependences, the techniques in [17], [31]
show how MBPTA can be adapted to provide a pWCET
estimate that upper bounds the execution time of all the
execution paths of the program, even when the user-provided
input vectors only exercise a subset of the paths.
Although EVT can be used with time-deterministic ar-
chitectures [30], there is no guarantee that EVT captures
the representative events that can occur at operation. This is
possible with MBPTA [4] and is the object of this work.
Several academic works have identified the issue of rep-
resentativeness of the event of interest [1], [20], [23]. Al-
though some authors indicated that representativeness can be
a risk [23], solutions have been provided later to mitigate the
risk [1], [20] for TRc. For instance, HoG [1] – explained in
Section II – is the first approach to solve this representativeness
issue in TRc. However, HoG relies on an approximate method
to obtain PTRceoi and so the number of runs needed, thus not
removing the risk completely. Our approach solves this issue
by providing an exact method to obtain PTRceoi and so the
minimum number of runs to use MBPTA.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The use of Extreme Value Theory in MBPTA is challenged
by the fact that the execution time observations used for the
prediction are those obtained at analysis time, while the pre-
dicted pWCET estimate must provide a reliable upper bound
during operation. Therefore, evidence is required proving that
execution time observations obtained at analysis time capture
the impact of relevant events affecting execution time and that
can arise during operation. Given the objects to be allocated
for an application, we have proposed an exact method to
compute the probability of cache related events of interest for
time-randomised caches for homogeneously accessed objects.
Our method identifies whether the probability of those events
is high enough to be relevant and low enough so that high
confidence on observing the event cannot be had. In that case
confidence on MBPTA is regained by increasing the number
of runs as indicated by our method.
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